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Abstract—In this paper, we study physical layer security
in an underlay cognitive radio (CR) network. We consider
the problem of secure communication between a secondary
transmitter-receiver pair in the presence of randomly distributed
eavesdroppers under an interference constraint set by the pri-
mary user. For different channel knowledge assumptions at the
transmitter, we design four transmission protocols to achieve the
secure transmission in the CR network. We give a comprehensive
performance analysis for each protocol in terms of transmission
delay, security, reliability, and the overall secrecy throughput.
Furthermore, we determine the optimal design parameter for
each transmission protocol by solving the optimization problem
of maximizing the secrecy throughput subject to both security
and reliability constraints. Numerical results illustrate the per-
formance comparison between different transmission protocols.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, cognitive radio networks,
on-off transmission, secrecy guard zone.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
With the rapid adoption of wireless devices, there is an
unprecedented growth in the demand for radio spectrum. To
address the conflict between spectrum scarcity and spectrum
underutilization, cognitive radio (CR) [1–3] has been regarded
as a promising technology to solve the problem of inefficient
spectrum usage. In CR networks, unlicensed secondary users
(SUs) are allowed to access the spectrum of licensed primary
users (PUs) with the requirement of not interfering the PUs.
Generally, there exist two paradigms of CR networks classified
by the spectrum access strategy: i) overlay CR [4, 5] and ii)
underlay CR [6, 7]. For the overlay CR, the SUs first adopt
spectrum sensing techniques to identify the licensed spectrum
hole, and then transmit data over the detected spectrum holes.
For the underlay CR, the SUs simultaneously utilize the
licensed spectrum while guaranteeing the interference at the
PU not beyond the acceptable threshold.
Allowing the spectrum sharing in the CR network is not
without drawbacks. The coexistence of licensed and unli-
censed users in the same network makes the data transmissions
vulnerable to security attacks [8]. To address this concern,
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innovative security technologies have been proposed for CR
networks [8]. As a complement to the traditional cryptographic
techniques [9], physical layer security (PLS) has been widely
studied [10] [11] to secure the wireless transmissions by
exploiting the fading characteristics of wireless channels.
To the best of authors’ knowledge, the current research
on PLS in CR networks assumed that either the channel
state information (CSI) of eavesdropping channel is perfectly
known or there are a small number of eavesdroppers at known
locations. In practical scenarios, a passive eavesdropper would
not reveal its CSI or location information to the legitimate
communication nodes, and hence such assumptions are not
always valid. Taking into account potentially a large number
of eavesdroppers inside the network at random and possibly
changing locations (due to mobility), a common analytical
approach is to model the location set of eavesdroppers to be a
stochastic process following some distribution [12–14]. For the
secure communication in CR networks, the consideration of
randomly distributed eavesdroppers has been rarely discussed
in CR networks.
B. Our Approach and Contribution
In this paper, we study the problem of achieving PLS in an
underlay CR network where a secondary transmitter (SU-Tx)
sends confidential information to a secondary receiver (SU-Rx)
over a quasi-static Rayleigh fading channel in the present of
multiple eavesdroppers. The location set of the eavesdroppers
is modeled as a homogeneous Poisson point process (HPPP).1
We consider different transmission protocols for the SU-
Tx to achieve secure communication while guaranteeing the
instantaneous interference to the primary receiver (PU-Rx) not
beyond a given threshold. To satisfy the interference constraint,
the transmit power at the SU-Tx is carefully adjusted, which
is determined by the instantaneous channel condition from the
SU-Tx to the PU-Rx.
We consider four transmission protocols to achieve the se-
cure transmission in the CR network: the full activity protocol,
the secrecy guard zone protocol, the threshold-based protocol
and the hybrid protocol. These four different protocols are
suitable for the scenarios with different assumptions on the
channel knowledge of the SU-Tx and the location knowledge
about the eavesdroppers. Specifically, the full activity protocol
is for the scenario where the SU-Tx does not have any
knowledge about the CSI of its receiver and the location
1HPPP has been widely adopted to model the eavesdropper locations in the
existing literature, e.g., [12, 13, 15].
2information of the eavesdroppers. The secrecy guard zone
protocol is for the scenario where the SU-Tx can detect
the existence of eavesdroppers in its vicinity, i.e., a circular
guard zone of radius r. The SU-Tx suspends the transmissions
when eavesdropper(s) are detected inside the guard zone. The
threshold-based protocol is for the scenario where the SU-Tx
can obtain a one-bit feedback about the SU-Tx’s instantaneous
channel gain. The SU-Tx suspends the transmissions when
the channel gain is worse than some threshold µ. Finally, the
hybrid protocol includes both the secrecy guard zone and the
threshold-based transmissions, hence, is expected to have the
best performance.
For each transmission protocol, we evaluate various quality-
of-service measures by studying performance metrics related
to transmission delay, security and reliability. Specifically, we
use outage-based metrics which are suitable for quasi-static
fading channels. Instead of adopting a widely-used outage
probability of secrecy capacity [16] which does not distinguish
between outages due to suspended transmission (i.e., delay),
information leakage to eavesdroppers (i.e., security) and un-
reliable reception at the intended receiver (i.e., reliability), we
use separate outage metrics for each type of quality of service.
We also define an outage metric called transmission secrecy
outage probability (TSOP) that comprehensively evaluates
the security and reliability performance in order to tell the
probability of having a secure and reliable transmission. The
tradeoff between security and reliability is also captured by
the TSOP. Finally, the overall performance of each protocol is
measured by the secrecy throughput defined as the achievable
average rate of secure and reliable transmissions.
We further optimize the design of transmission proto-
cols based on the derived outage probabilities and secrecy
throughput expressions. To this end, we study the optimization
problem of achieving the maximal secrecy throughput with
given security and reliability outage constraints. We first study
the feasible security and reliability constraints for each trans-
mission protocol, under which a non-zero secrecy throughput
is achievable. We then obtain the closed-form solutions of
the optimal guard zone’s radius r and/or the optimal SNR-
threshold µ that maximize the secrecy throughput for the
corresponding transmission protocols. Our results show that
the secrecy guard zone protocol is preferred when the security
constraint is stringent while the threshold-based protocol is
preferred when the reliability constraint is stringent.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II discusses the related work. Section III gives the channel
model and performance metrics. Section IV introduces the
four transmission protocols. Sections V and VI evaluate and
optimize the transmission protocols, respectively. Section VII
presents the numerical results. Finally, Section VIII concludes
the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Underlay CR communications [6, 7] has received a lot of
attention as a promising paradigm to improve spectrum usage
efficiency, e.g., [17–19] focusing on the performance analysis
and [20–24] investigating the network design. In recent years,
there has been increasing interest in the security issue of
CR networks, due to the rapid growing amount of private
and sensitive data transmitted in wireless networks. From an
information-theoretic perspective, the performance of PLS in
CR networks was studied in, e.g., [25–29]. The ergodic secrecy
capacity for the CR network was evaluated in [25, 26] with
the consideration of fast fading channels where the encoded
messages are assumed to span sufficient channel realizations to
capture the ergodic features of the fading channel. Considering
the slow fading channels, the secrecy performance of the CR
network was evaluated in [27] by the outage-based formula-
tion. The secrecy throughput scaling laws were investigated in
[28, 29]. More recently, various signal processing techniques
and system design protocols were proposed to improve the
secrecy performance of the CR networks. For the multi-
antenna CR network, beamforming designs and cooperative
jamming techniques were studied in [30–32]. For the CR
network with multiple SUs, the user scheduling scheme for
improving the security level of cognitive transmissions was
proposed in [33]. Furthermore, the CR network with decode
and forward relays was studied in [34] where the optimal relay
selection scheme to minimize the secrecy outage probability
was proposed.
As mentioned in Section I-A, the consideration of randomly
distributed eavesdroppers has been rarely discussed in CR
networks. However, the randomly distributed eavesdroppers
are often considered in the study on PLS in large-scale wireless
networks using tools from stochastic geometry [35]. The
network model based upon stochastic geometry allows us to
study the probabilistic network behaviors and corresponding
performance metrics [36–38]. In particular, the location set
of the randomly distributed eavesdroppers is often modeled
by the HPPP, e.g., [12, 14, 15, 39–41]. The HPPP-based model
not only provides tractable closed-form results but also de-
scribes the randomness of eavesdropper locations in practical
scenarios [41]. Specifically, Goel et al. [14] introduced a
secrecy graph model based on the HPPP to capture the
uncertainty in eavesdropper locations at the network level.
Pinto et al. [12] proposed the Poisson iS-graph to study the
secrecy connectivity of large scale network. Zhou et al. [15]
investigated the secrecy transmission capacity of the wireless
network. Furthermore, the scaling laws for secrecy capacity
were investigated in [39–41]. For the secure communication
in CR networks, the consideration of randomly distributed
eavesdroppers has been studied in [42, 43], in which Shu
et al. considered that the message to the PU is confidential
and derived the secrecy capacity in the presence of randomly
distributed eavesdroppers whose location set is modeled as
a HPPP. However, the work in [42, 43] only considered a
simplified channel model consisting of the pass loss effect
only, while the fading effect is not considered. It is important
to note that the performance of secure communication is
very different between a fading and a non-fading scenario.
Furthermore, the presence of fading can be smartly utilized to
achieve a better security performance.
It is worth mentioning that the literature review in this
section focuses on only the most closely related work in the
areas of CR networks, PLS in CR networks, and PLS in
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a cognitive radio network with a Poisson field of
eavesdroppers.
large-scale wireless networks. Due to the rapid development of
wireless technology and the increasing demand of secure com-
munications, there also exists many other interesting studies
on the current and next generation of wireless networks and
communication security, e.g., [44–56].
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Channel Model
As shown in Figure 1, we consider an underlay CR network
that consists of a primary transmitter-receiver pair and a sec-
ondary transmitter-receiver pair. The SU-Tx sends confidential
messages to the SU-Rx in the present of multiple movable
eavesdroppers, which are denoted by {Ej |j = 1, 2, · · ·}. The
primary network allows the secondary network to share the
spectrum by underlay method, and requires that the instanta-
neous interference power at PU-Rx from SU-Tx is lower than
a threshold, denoted by I0.
We assume that the eavesdroppers are randomly distributed
in the network. The location set of the eavesdroppers, denoted
by ΦE , is modeled as a HPPP with density λE . Different
from the deterministic model, the spatial HPPP introduces
total randomness for the node deployment, and only the node
density variable is required to characterize this stochastic
process. In addition, the randomness introduced by the HPPP-
based model has the advantage of being tractable in perfor-
mance analysis, since it often leads to closed-form results
on statistical analysis for signal attenuation laws [57]. By
adopting the PPP-based topology for wireless networks with
randomly distributed nodes, important results on connectivity,
coverage, and throughput have been successfully derived in
[36, 58, 59].
In this work, we assume that all communication nodes
have a single antenna and the wireless communication channel
is modeled as a path-loss plus quasi-static Rayleigh fading
channel. Denote the transmitter power at SU-Tx as P . Then,
the received signal to noise ratios (SNRs) at the SU-Rx and
eavesdropper Ej are given by
γD =
P
σ2D
|hSD|2 d−αSD (1)
and
γEj =
P
σ2Ej
∣∣hSEj ∣∣2 d−αSEj , (2)
respectively, where α ≥ 2 denotes the path loss exponent,
dSD and dSEj denote the distance from SU-Tx to SU-Rx
and the distance from SU-Tx to Ej , respectively, σ2D and
σ2Ej denote additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) variances
at SU-Rx and Ej , respectively, with σ2D = σ
2
Ej
= σ2. In
addition, hSD and hSEj denote the channel coefficients for the
channel from SU-Tx to SU-Rx and the channel from SU-Tx
to Ej , respectively, which are modeled as complex Gaussian
variables with zero mean and unit variance, i.e., CN (0, 1). We
further assume that the interferences from PU-Tx at the SU-
Rx and the eavesdroppers are neglectable. We highlight that
such an assumption is widely adopted in the literature studying
CR networks, e.g., [27, 33, 60–62]. A practical example that
approximates this occurrence is the scenario where the PU-
Tx is located far away from the terminals in the secondary
network [61].
We assume that the receiver side (including PU-Rx, SU-
Rx and the eavesdroppers) has the perfect CSI, while the
availability of CSI at the transmitter-side is different between
PU-Rx and SU-Rx due to the different capabilities of the com-
munication terminals. We consider a scenario where the PU-
Rx is a cellular base station which is capable of instantaneous
CSI feedback to both PT-Tx and SU-Tx, while the SU-Rx
is not capable of full CSI feedback. Specifically, the PU-Rx
feeds back to the SU-Tx with the instantaneous channel gain,
denoted by |hSP |2, to enable the SU-Tx to adjust its transmit
power to satisfy the interference constraint [17–19].2 Although
the SU-Rx is not capable of full CSI feedback, we consider
the possibility of a low-complexity feedback scheme in which
the SU-Rx uses one bit to inform SU-Tx about its channel
condition. The eavesdroppers are totally passive, and hence
their CSI is not revealed to SU-Tx.
To satisfy the instantaneous interference constraint, I0, the
SU-Tx adjusts the transmit power to
P =
I0
|hSP |2 d−αSP
1(condition), (3)
where dSP denotes the distance from SU-Tx to PU-Rx, and
hSP ∼ CN (0, 1). The 1(condition) in (3) denotes an indicator
function for whether the transmission is “on” or “off” at SU-
Tx, which is given by
1(condition) =
{
1, if the condition holds
0, otherwise,
(4)
where the condition depends on the specifical transmission
protocol, and will be detailed later in Sections IV. Note that
having such an “on-off” transmission strategy can effectively
improve the security and/or reliability performance, as will be
shown in Sections V.
2This can be achieved through a spectrum-band manager that mediates
between the licensed and unlicensed users [63]. However, it is worth noting
that, for certain scenarios, obtaining the interference channel power gains
may be challenging. For these cases, our results serve as the bounds for the
performance of the considered network.
4For a robust analysis, we consider that all eavesdroppers
can collude and exchange information. Thus, the multiple
eavesdroppers can be regarded as a single eavesdropper, Ejoint,
with multiple distributed antennas, and the equivalent received
SNR at the Ejoint is given by
γE =
P
σ2
∑
Ej∈ΦE
∣∣hSEj ∣∣2d−αSEj . (5)
From (1) and (5), we note that γD and γE have the same power
variable P , which makes them correlated with each other. For
convenience, we define ZΦE =
∑
Ej∈ΦE
∣∣hSEj ∣∣2d−αSEj in the
following analysis.
B. Secure Encoding
The SU-Tx uses the widely-adopted wiretap code [64] to
encode the confidential messages. Let C (RB , RS) denote the
set of all possible Wyner codes, where RB is the codeword
transmission rate and RS is the confidential information rate
with RB > RS . The rate difference RB−RS reflects the cost
of securing the message against eavesdropping. We assume
that the encoding rates have already been designed, and hence
RB and RS are fixed.3 Such a fixed-rate transmission scheme
is suitable for practical applications requiring low complexity,
e.g., video streams in multimedia.
C. Outage Probability Metrics
In the following, we detail the outage definitions for char-
acterizing the transmission delay, the security performance
and the reliability performance of the network. Moreover, we
propose a new probability metric to comprehensively evaluate
the joint performance of security and reliability.
1) TP: Since the transmission may not always happen at
SU-Tx depending on the transmission protocol, there exists a
probability of transmission referred to as TP, which is given
by
ptx = P
(
1(condition) = 1
)
, (6)
where P(·) denotes the probability measure. We adopt the
probability of transmission as a measure of the performance
of transmission delay [65].
2) SOP and COP: With the fixed-rate wiretap code, there
exist two kinds of outage events [65, 66]: secrecy outage
event and connection outage event. The secrecy outage event
happens when the perfect secrecy of the message cannot be
guaranteed, and the probability of the secrecy outage referred
to as SOP is given by [65]
pso = P
(
CE > RB −RS |1(condition) = 1
)
, (7)
where CE = log (1 + γE) denotes the channel capacity of
Ejoint. The connection outage event happens when the message
cannot be decoded at the intended receiver without error, and
the probability of the connection outage referred to as COP is
given by
pco = P
(
CB < RB |1(condition) = 1
)
, (8)
3The design of rate parameters is beyond the scope of this work.
where CB = log (1 + γD) denotes the channel capacity of the
secondary link. In this work, we adopt the SOP as a measure
of the security performance and the COP as a measure of the
reliability performance.
3) TSOP: From (7) and (8), we note that the security and
reliability become correlated in the considered CR network
due to the correlation between γD and γE . This is actually
different from the case in most of the non-cognitive scenarios,
e.g., [15, 66, 67]. Therefore, it is necessary to comprehensively
study the joint performance of the security and the reliability.
To this end, we propose a new outage performance metric,
namely transmission secrecy outage probability (TSOP). The
TSOP characterizes the probability that either secrecy outage
or connection outage happens, which is given by
ptso =1−P
(
CE≤RB−RS , CB≥RB |1(condition) = 1
)
. (9)
Remark 1: Comparing the expressions of pso, pco and ptso
in (7), (8) and (9), we note that the TSOP takes the mutual
correlation between the SOP and the COP into account. For the
special case that SOP and COP are independent,4 the TSOP
can be further derived as
ptso = 1− (1− pco) (1− pso) . (10)
Remark 2: The proposed TSOP characterizes the joint se-
curity and reliability performance. In fact, a similar concept of
jointly measuring security and reliability performance can be
found in another widely-adopted outage probability definition,
i.e., pout = P (CS < RS) [16], where CS denotes the secrecy
capacity. Compared with the expression of pout, the proposed
TSOP takes into account the system design parameters, such as
the rate of the transmitted codewords as well as the condition
under which message transmission happens.
D. Secrecy Throughput
The overall performance of the system is measured by
the secrecy throughput taking into account the transmission
delay, the security performance and the reliability performance
together. The secrecy throughput is given by
η = ptx (1− ptso)RS , (11)
where ptx is the TP in (6) and ptso is the TSOP in (9).
As mentioned before, ptx quantizes the transmission delay
performance and ptso quantizes the joint security and reliability
performance. As such, the secrecy throughput in (11) quantizes
the average secrecy rate at which the messages are securely
and reliably transmitted to SU-Rx.
It is worth mentioning that the secrecy throughput in (11)
is different from the throughput definition in [65] and [66].
In [65] and [66], the throughput is formulated as
η = ptx (1− pco)RS , (12)
which quantizes the average secrecy rate at which the mes-
sages are reliably transmitted to SU-Rx. We find that the
throughput expression in (12) does not reflect whether the
4When the transmit power is fixed in cognitive or non-cognitive networks,
the SOP and COP usually are independent [15, 66, 67].
5transmission is secure, and hence it is proper to use the secrecy
throughput expression in (11) for characterizing the overall
performance of the transmission.
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION PROTOCOLS
For the considered CR network as described in Section III,
there are four possible cases of channel knowledge assump-
tions at the SU-Tx, which are detailed as follows: 1) SU-Tx
does not know any information about the channel condition
to the SU-Rx and does not know any information about
the eavesdropper locations; 2) SU-Tx does not know any
information about the channel condition to the SU-Rx but
can detect the existence of eavesdroppers in its vicinity; 3)
SU-Rx has the one-bit feedback about the channel condition
to the SU-Rx but does not know any information about the
eavesdropper locations; 4) SU-Rx has the one-bit feedback
about the channel condition to the SU-Rx and can detect
the existence of eavesdroppers in its vicinity. These four
cases complete the possible channel knowledge assumptions
at the SU-Tx for the considered CR network. Accordingly,
we design four secure transmission protocols which are full
activity protocol, secrecy guard zone protocol, threshold-based
protocol and hybrid protocol. The details of each protocol are
given in the following subsections.
A. Full Activity Protocol
For the full activity protocol, the SU-Tx can neither obtain
the one-bit feedback from the SU-Rx nor detect the existence
of eavesdroppers in its vicinity. Therefore, the SU-Tx keeps
sending the confidential information to the SU-Rx all the time
while satisfying the power constraints. This protocol is the
simplest protocol amongst the four transmission protocols.
Since the BS is always active, the indicator function in (4)
is always equal to one, and the SNRs at the SU-Rx and the
eavesdropper Ejoint are given by
γD =
I0|hSD|2d−αSD
σ2|hSP |2d−αSP
(13)
and
γE =
I0
σ2|hSP |2d−αSP
ZΦE , (14)
respectively.
B. Secrecy Guard Zone Protocol
For the secrecy guard protocol, we consider the scenario
where the SU-Tx is able to detect the existence of eavesdrop-
pers within a finite range. As per the mechanism of secrecy
guard zone [15, 68], we model the finite range around the SU-
Tx as a secrecy guard circle B with radius r. The SU-Tx sends
messages only when there is no eavesdropper detected inside
the guard circle. Consequently, the SNRs at the SU-Rx and
the eavesdropper Ejoint under the secrecy guard zone protocol
are given by
γD =
I0|hSD|2d−αSD
σ2|hSP |2d−αSP
1(C1) (15)
and
γE =
I0
σ2|hSP |2d−αSP
ZΦE1(C1), (16)
respectively, where C1 denotes the event that no eaves-
dropper is detected inside the secrecy guard zone, i.e.,{
C1 : ∀Ej ∈ ΦE , dSEj > r
}
.
C. Threshold-Based Protocol
In the threshold-based protocol, we assume that the SU-Tx
can obtain a one-bit feedback from the SU-Rx to enable a
threshold-based on-off transmission. Specifically, the SU-Tx
transmits only when the received SNR at SU-Rx is larger
than a predetermined threshold µ. Otherwise, the SU-Tx
suspends the transmission. To this end, the SU-Rx sends an
instantaneous one-bit feedback to the SU-Tx for indicating
whether the received SNR is larger the threshold µ. In such a
protocol, the SNRs at the SU-Rx and the eavesdropper Ejoint
are given by
γD =
I0|hSD|2d−αSD
σ2|hSP |2d−αSP
1(C2) (17)
and
γE =
I0
σ2|hSP |2d−αSP
ZΦE1(C2) (18)
respectively, where C2 denotes the event that the SNR at the
SU-Rx is larger than µ, i.e.,
{
C2 :
I0|hSD|2d−αSD
σ2|hSP |2d−αSP
> µ
}
.
D. Hybrid Protocol
In this protocol, we assume that the SU-Tx can not only
detect the existence of eavesdroppers within the secrecy guard
zone but also obtain the one-bit feedback from the SU-
Rx, and hence, the SU-Tx adopts a joint secrecy guard
zone and SNR threshold based transmission strategy. As
the same to Section IV-B, we denote the secrecy guard
zone as a circle B with radius r around the SU-Tx. As
the same to Section IV-C, we denote the received SNR
threshold as µ. The SU-Tx transmits only when both of
the following two conditions are satisfied: 1) there is no
eavesdropper in the secrecy guard zone around the SU-Tx;
2) the received SNR at SU-Rx is larger than the threshold
µ. The AND rule is applied at the SU-Tx for determining
whether to transmit, and the condition for transmission is given
by
{
C1&C2 : ∀Ej ∈ ΦE , dSEj > r and I0|hSD|
2d−αSD
σ2|hSP |2d−αSP
> µ
}
.
Then, the SNRs at the SU-Rx and the eavesdropper Ejoint are
given by
γD =
I0|hSD|2d−αSD
σ2|hSP |2d−αSP
1(C1&C2) (19)
and
γE =
I0
σ2|hSP |2d−αSP
ZΦE1(C1&C2), (20)
respectively.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive the TP, the COP, the SOP and the
TSOP for different transmission protocols, to characterize the
transmission delay, the reliability, the security and the joint
security and reliability performance, respectively.
6A. Full Activity Protocol
In the full activity protocol, there is no transmission con-
straint imposed on the SU-Tx. Therefore, the TP is given by
ptx = 1, which means that there is no transmission delay.
Substituting (13) into (8), the COP is derived as
pco = P (log (1 + γD) < RB)
= P
(
|hSD|2<
(
2RB−1)σ2dαSD
I0dαSP
|hSP |2
)
=
(
2RB − 1)σ2dαSD
(2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
. (21)
Substituting (14) into (7), the SOP is derived as
pso = P (log2 (1 + γE) > RB −RS)
= P
(
log2
(
1 +
I0
σ2|hSP |2d−αSP
ZΦE
)
> RB −RS
)
= EΦE
{
1− exp
(
− I0ZΦEd
α
SP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)}
= 1− LZΦE
(
I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)
,
(22)
where EΦE {·} denote the expectation operator over ΦE , and
LZΦE (·) denotes the Laplace transform of ZΦE . As given in
[69], LZΦE (s) = exp
(−2piλEs2/α/αΓ (1− 2α)Γ ( 2α)).
Substituting (13) and (14) into (9), the TSOP is derived as
ptso =1−P (log2 (1+γE)<RB −RS & log2 (1+γD)>RB)
=1− P
(
log2
(
1 +
I0
|hSP |2d−αSP
ZΦE
σ2
)
< RB −RS
& log2
(
1 +
I0
|hSP |2d−αSP
|hSD|2d−αSD
σ2
)
> RB
)
=1−EΦE

∫ ∞
I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS−1)σ2
ZΦE
e
−
(
(2RB−1)σ2dαSD
I0d
α
SP
+1
)
y
dy

=1− I0d
α
SP
(2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
× LZΦE
((
2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)
.
(23)
From (21), (22) and (23), we find that ptso can be also written
as a function of pso and pco, given by
ptso = 1− (1− pco) (1− pso)(1−pco)
−2/α
. (24)
Note that (24) is different from (10). This verifies that the
COP and the SOP are correlated for the CR network studied
in this paper. Besides, we note that none of pco, pso and ptso is
controllable in the full activity protocol, since all of I0, RB ,
RS , dSP and dSD are not design parameters.
B. Secrecy Guard Zone Protocol
In this protocol, the SU-Tx transmits only when there is
no eavesdropper inside the secrecy guard zone. We denote the
location of the SU-Tx as the origin o. Then, the secrecy guard
zone around the SU-Tx with radius r is denoted by B (o, r).
Note that the number of eavesdroppers inside B (o, r), denoted
by N , is a Poisson random variable with mean pir2λE . Thus,
its probability mass function (PMF) is given by
P (N = n) = exp
(−pir2λE) (pir2λE)n
n!
. (25)
Then, the TP is derived as
ptx = P
(
C1 : ∀Ej ∈ ΦE , dSEj > r
)
= P (N = 0)
= exp
(−piλEr2) . (26)
Substituting (15) into (8), we can obtain the COP for the
secrecy guard zone protocol, which turns out to be identical
to (21) and is omitted here.
Denote Φ˜E as the new location set of the eavesdrop-
pers for the scenario where the transmission happens,
i.e., no eavesdropper is inside the secrecy guard zone.
Then, the received SNR at the eavesdropper Ejoint for
the scenario where the transmission happens is given by
γE =
P
σ2
∑
Ej∈Φ˜E
∣∣hSEj ∣∣2d−αSEj . Here, we define ZΦ˜E =∑
Ej∈Φ˜E
∣∣hSEj ∣∣2d−αSEj . Thus, the SOP for the secrecy guard
zone protocol can be derived by following the same step of
(22), which is given by
pso = 1− LZΦ˜E
(
I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)
. (27)
From the viewpoint of the SU-Tx, the location set, Φ˜E ,
still follows a homogeneous PPP with density λE outside the
secrecy guard zone B (o, r). Then, the Laplace transform of
ZΦ˜E is derived as
LZΦ˜E
(s)=E
Φ˜E ,|hSEj |2
exp
−s ∑
Ej∈Φ˜E
∣∣hSEj ∣∣2d−αSEj

(a)
= EΦ˜E
 ∏
Ej∈Φ˜E
E|hSEj |2
{
exp
(
−s∣∣hSEj ∣∣2d−αSEj)}

(b)
= EΦ˜E
 ∏
Ej∈Φ˜E
1
1 + sd−αSEj

(c)
= exp
[
−λE
∫
R2\B(o,r)
(
1− 1
1 + sx−α
)
dx
]
,
(28)
where (a) is because of the independence between the channel
gain
∣∣hSEj ∣∣2 and the location of eavesdroppers, (b) follows
from the exponential distribution of
∣∣hSEj ∣∣2, (c) follows
from the generating function of the homogeneous PPP Φ˜E .
Following from the double integral in polar coordinates, the
Laplace transform ZΦ˜E is finally given by
LZΦ˜E
(s) = exp
(
− 2
α
piλEs
2/αB(rαs−1+1)−1
(
1− 2
α
,
2
α
))
, (29)
where Bx (p, q) =
∫ x
0
tp−1 (1− t)q−1 dt is the incomplete
Beta function [70]. As such, by substituting (29) into (27),
7we can derive the closed-form expression for the SOP. Since
Bx (p, q) is an increasing function of x for any given (p, q),
the Laplace transform is an increasing function of r.
Based on (15), (16) and (9), the TSOP is derived as
ptso = 1− P (log2 (1 + γE) < RB −RS
& log2 (1 + γD) > RB |1(C1) = 1
)
= 1− I0d
α
SP
(2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
× LZΦ˜E
((
2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)
.
(30)
From (21), (27) and (30), we note that ptso for the secrecy
guard zone protocol can be also written as a function of pso
and pco, given by
ptso = 1− (1− pco) (1− pso)r1(1−pco)
−2/α
, (31)
where
r1 = B(rαs−12 +1)
−1
(
1− 2
α
,
2
α
)/
B(rαs−11 +1)
−1
(
1− 2
α
,
2
α
)
with
s1 = I0d
α
SP
/(
2RB−RS − 1)σ2,
s2 =
((
2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP ) / (2RB−RS − 1)σ2.
This, once again, confirms that the COP and the SOP are
correlated for the CR network studied in this paper, since (31)
is different from (10).
Remark 3: It can be inferred from (27) and (30) that pso and
ptso are decreasing functions of r, since the Laplace transform
is an increasing function of r. This implies that a large secrecy
guard zone is beneficial for reducing the SOP and the TSOP
of the secondary network. On the other hand, it can be inferred
from (26) that ptx is a decreasing function of r. This indicates
that a large secrecy guard zone degrades the transmission
delay performance. Hence, there arises a tradeoff between the
security performance and the transmission delay performance
incurred by the size of secrecy guard zone. Moreover, we note
that the COP is still uncontrollable in this protocol, and hence
having the secrecy guard zone does not help to control the
reliability performance.
C. Threshold-Based Protocol
In this protocol, the SU-Tx transmits only when γD is larger
than the predetermined threshold µ ∈ [0,∞). Consequently,
the TP is given by
ptx = P (C2 : γD > µ)
=
I0d
α
SP
µσ2dαSD + I0d
α
SP
.
(33)
Note that only when µ ∈ [0, 2RB − 1), the connection
outage exists. Substituting (17) into (8), the COP for µ ∈[
0, 2RB − 1) is derived as
pco = P
(
log (1 + γD) < RB |1(C2) = 1
)
=
P (log (1 + γD) < RB , γD > µ)
P (γD > µ)
= 1− µσ
2dαSD + I0d
α
SP
(2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
.
(34)
Then, the COP for µ ≥ 0 is given by
pco =
1−
µσ2dαSD+I0d
α
SP
(2RB−1)σ2dαSD+I0dαSP
, 0 ≤ µ<2RB−1,
0, 2RB−1 ≤ µ.
(35)
Substituting (18) into (7), the SOP for the threshold-based
protocol is derived as
pso = P
(
log2 (1 + γE) > RB −RS |1(C2) = 1
)
=
P (log2 (1 + γE) > RB −RS , γD > µ)
P (γD > µ)
=
EΦE
∫
I0d
α
SP ZΦE
(2RB−RS−1)N0
0 exp
(
−
(
µσ2dαSD
I0dαSP
+1
)
y
)
dy

I0dαSP
/
(µσ2dαSD + I0d
α
SP )
= 1− LZΦE
(
µσ2dαSD + I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)
.
(36)
Substituting (17) and (18) into (9), the TSOP for this
protocol is derived as (37), shown at the top of this page.
In addition, from (35) and (36), ptso can be also written as
a function of pso and pco, given by
ptso =
{
1−(1−pco) (1−pso)(1−pco)
−2/α
, 0 ≤ µ < 2RB−1,
pso, 2
RB − 1 ≤ µ.
(38)
Remark 4: In the threshold-based protocol, it is worth
noting that the COP is a decreasing function of µ while
the SOP is an increasing function of µ. This is due to the
adaptive transmit power scheme at the SU-Tx. With such a
transmit power scheme, the received SNR at the eavesdropper
is probably large when the received SNR at the SU-Rx is
large. Thus, the value of µ arises a tradeoff between the
security performance and the reliability performance for the
threshold-based protocol. Besides, we find that the TP is a
decreasing function of µ, which implies that there is also a
tradeoff between the transmission delay performance and the
reliability performance incurred by µ.
D. Hybrid Protocol
In the hybrid protocol, the SU-Tx transmits only when there
is no eavesdropper in the secrecy guard zone around the SU-
Tx and the received SNR at SU-Rx is larger than the threshold
µ. The TP is given by
ptx = P
(
C1&C2 : ∀Ej ∈ ΦE , dSEj > D and γD > µ
)
=
I0d
α
SP
µσ2dαSD + I0d
α
SP
exp
(−piλED2) . (39)
The derivation of the COP is identical to (35) in the
threshold-based protocol. Similar with the derivation of (36)
and considering the effect of secrecy guard zone, the SOP for
the hybrid protocol is derived as
pso = 1− LZΦ˜E
(
µσ2dαSD + I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)
. (40)
8ptso = 1− P
(
log2 (1 + γE) < RB −RS & log2 (1 + γD) > RB |1(C2) = 1
)
= 1− 1
ptx
EΦE

∫ ∞
I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS−1)σ2
ZΦE
exp
(
−
(
max
{
µ, 2RB − 1}σ2dαSD
I0dαSP
+ 1
)
y
)
dy

=

1− µσ
2dαSD + I0d
α
SP
(2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
LZΦE
((
2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
(2RB−RS−1)σ2
)
, 0 ≤ µ<2RB−1,
1− LIΦE
(
µσ2dαSD + I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS−1)σ2
)
, 2RB − 1 ≤ µ.
(37)
ptso = 1− P
(
log2 (1 + γE) < RB −RS & log2 (1 + γD) > RB |1(C1&C2) = 1
)
=

1− µσ
2dαSD + I0d
α
SP
(2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
LZΦ˜E
((
2RB − 1)σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)
, 0 < µ < 2RB − 1,
1− LZΦ˜E
(
µσ2dαSD + I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)
, 2RB − 1 ≤ µ.
(41)
Also, substituting (19) and (20) into (9), the TSOP for this
protocol is given by (41), shown at the top of this page.
From (35), (40) and (41), we find that ptso can be also
written as a function of pso and pco, given by
ptso =
{
1−(1−pco) (1−pso)r2(1−pco)
−2/α
, 0≤µ<2RB−1,
pso, 2
RB − 1 ≤ µ,
(42)
where
r2 =B(rαs−12 +1)
−1
(
1− 2
α
,
2
α
)/
B(rαs−13 +1)
−1
(
1− 2
α
,
2
α
)
with s3 =
µσ2dαSD+I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS−1)σ2 . The impact of security performance
and reliability performance on the joint security and reliability
performance for the hybrid protocol is mathematically charac-
terized by (42).
VI. SECRECY THROUGHPUT MAXIMIZATION
From the previous section, we find that each of r and
µ plays a very important role in the performance of the
transmission. Specifically, the value of r incurs a tradeoff
between the security performance and the transmission delay
performance. The value of µ incurs tradeoffs not only between
the reliability performance and the security performance, but
also between the reliability performance and the transmission
delay performance.
To optimize the performance of the transmission protocols,
in this section, we obtain the optimal r and/or µ that max-
imize the secrecy throughput subject to secrecy outage and
connection outage constraints. The optimization problem is
formulated as
max
r and/or µ
η = ptx (1− pto)RS
s. t. pso ≤ ε, pco ≤ δ, r ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0,
(43)
where ptx, pco, pso and ptso for different protocols are derived
in the previous section. When the parameter to optimize is
µ, it corresponds to the threshold-based protocol; when the
parameter to optimize is r, it corresponds to the secrecy guard
zone protocol; when the the parameters to optimize are µ and
r, it corresponds to the hybrid protocol.
In the following two subsections, we first investigate the
feasible secrecy outage and connection outage constraints for
each transmission protocol, under which a non-zero secrecy
throughput is achievable. We then obtain the optimal solutions
of r and/or µ that maximize the secrecy throughput subject
to the secrecy outage and connection outage constraints.
Although there is no design parameter (i.e., r or µ) to optimize
for the full activity protocol, we show the feasible secrecy
outage and connection outage constraints for the full activity
protocol for comparison with other transmission protocols.
A. Feasibility of Constraints for Different Protocols
We denote F (1) , F (2) , F (3) and F (4) as the feasible
constraints for the full activity protocol, the secrecy guard zone
protocol, the threshold-based protocol and the hybrid protocol,
respectively, which are detailed as follows.
F (1): For the full activity protocol, since neither the COP
nor the SOP is controllable, the security and reliability con-
straints are either always achievable or always not achievable.
The feasible constraint range for the full activity scheme is
given as a square area in the 2-D plane of ε and δ
F (1) = {(ε, δ) : ε1 ≤ ε ≤ 1, δ1 ≤ δ ≤ 1} , (44)
where δ1 and ε1 denote the COP in (21) and the SOP in (22),
respectively.
F (2): For the secrecy guard zone protocol, the SOP is a
decreasing function of r and lim
r→∞ pso = 0, while the COP
is still uncontrollable. Hence, the feasible constraint range for
the secrecy guard zone protocol is given by
F (2) = {(ε, δ) : 0 < ε ≤ 1, δ1 ≤ δ ≤ 1} . (45)
F (3): For the threshold-based protocol, the COP is a
decreasing function of µ while the SOP is an increasing
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Fig. 2. An illustration of the feasible constraint region for the network with
RB = 3, RS = 1 and I0/δ2 = 10.
function of µ. To be specific, when δ ≥ δ1, the minimum
value of ε is ε1 since µ can be set to zero; when δ < δ1, by
setting pco = δ, we can obtain the minimum value of the ε as
ε2 = 1− LZΦE
(
(1− δ)
(
2RB−1
)
σ2dαSD+I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS − 1)σ2
)
. (46)
Therefore, the feasible constraint range for the threshold-based
protocol is given by
F (3) = {(ε, δ) : max (ε1, ε2) ≤ ε ≤ 1, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1} . (47)
F (4): For the hybrid protocol, through the analysis in
Sections V we know that lim
r→∞ pso = 0 and if µ ≥ 2
RB−1,
pco = 0. So, any required reliability and security constraints
are feasible by appropriately adjusting µ and r. Hence, the
feasible constraint range for the hybrid protocol is given by
F (4) = {(ε, δ) : 0 < ε ≤ 1, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1} . (48)
Figure 2 gives an example of the feasible reliability and
security constraints for different protocols. The feasible con-
straint region for the full activity protocol is shown as the
square field A in the figure. The field of A∪B is the feasible
constraint region of the secrecy guard zone protocol. It is
observed that the secrecy guard zone protocol allows a more
stringent security constraint, which can arbitrarily approach
zero. The feasible constraint region of the threshold-based
protocol is the field of A ∪ C. As shown in the figure, the
threshold-based protocol extends the reliability constraint to
the 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Meanwhile, at field C, the feasible value
of ε increases with the stringent of the reliability constraint.
The feasible constraint region for the hybrid protocol is given
by A ∪ B ∪ C ∪ D. The hybrid protocol extends the feasible
constraint region to the whole ε− δ plane field.
B. Optimal Design
Note that when r = 0 and µ = 0, the hybrid protocol
reduces to the full activity protocol; when µ = 0, the hybrid
protocol reduces to the secrecy guard zone protocol; when
r = 0, the hybrid protocol reduces to the threshold-based
protocol. Thus, the hybrid protocol mathematically includes
all of the other three transmission protocols as special cases.
In this subsection, we show the optimal solutions for the hybrid
protocol only, and the optimal solutions for the other protocols
can be easily obtained accordingly.
The solution to the optimization problem for the hybrid
protocol is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The optimal design parameters (r∗, µ∗) of
the hybrid protocol are given by
(r∗, µ∗)=

(0, [0, µUB]) , if ε≥ε1 and δ≥δ1,
(g (0) , 0) , if 0 < ε<ε1 and δ≥δ1,
(0, [µLB, µUB]) , if ε ≥ ε2 and 0 ≤ δ < δ1,
(g (µLB) , µLB) , if 0<ε<ε2 and 0≤δ<δ1,
(49)
where
g(µ)=(φ (µ))
1/α
(B−1−α ln(1−ε)
2piλE(φ(µ))
1/α
(
1−2
α
,
2
α
))−1
− 1
1/α, (50)
µLB = (1− δ)
(
2RB − 1)− I0dαSP
σ2dαSD
δ, (51)
µUB = min
2RB − 1,
(
−α ln (1− ε)
2piλEΓ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
2
α
))α/2 2RB−RS − 1
dαSD
− I0d
α
SP
σ2dαSD
 ,
(52)
with φ (µ) = µσ
2dαSD+I0d
α
SP
(2RB−RS−1)σ2 and B
−1
x (p, q) representing the
inverse function of Bx (p, q).
Proof: See Appendix. 
Remark 5: The optimal r and µ vary with the security
and reliability constraints. Note that the optimal values of
µ are given by feasible regions for particular constraints.
Specifically, if a higher reliability level is required, it is wise to
set µ∗ = µUB; if a higher security level is required, it is wise
to set µ∗ = µLB. Meanwhile, a higher security level requires
a larger optimal r and confines the upper bound of µ, while a
higher reliability level requires a larger lower bound of µ and
a larger optimal r. We also find that with fixed security and
reliability constraints, the optimal r is an increasing function
of the eavesdropper density and the upper bound of µ is a
decreasing function of the eavesdropper density. Furthermore,
we note that η is a decreasing function of r. Therefore, secrecy
throughput should be compromised (i.e., allowing a smaller
value of η) in order to achieve higher security and reliability
levels.
It is worth mentioning that similar secrecy guard zone
protocols have been previously studied in, e.g., [12, 13, 15],
and similar threshold-based protocols has been previously in-
vestigated in, e.g., [65, 71]. Different from the existing secrecy
guard zone protocols in [12, 13, 15], our proposed secrecy
guard zone protocol is applicable in the CR network where the
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SU-Tx has an adaptive transmit power. Most importantly, none
of [12, 13, 15] has studied the optimal design of the secrecy
guard zone. In contrast, we have derived the optimal radius of
the guard zone that maximizes the secrecy throughput. Note
that the optimal design of the radius is very important for
the performance of the secrecy guard zone protocol. Different
from the existing threshold-based protocols in [65, 71], our
proposed threshold-based protocol is specifically designed for
the CR network where the SU-Tx has an adaptive transmit
power. The consideration of adaptive transmit power at the SU-
Tx protects the primary network from interference by ensuring
a low interference power received at the primary user. We have
derived the optimal design of the threshold value, which is
dependent on the conditions of both the channel from SU-Tx
to PU-Rx and the channel from SU-Tx to SU-Rx. Although
the optimal SNR threshold has also been designed in [65], the
result in [65] cannot be applied in the secure CR network.
In [65], the transmit power is simply a fixed value without
the consideration of protecting the primary network from
interference. Actually, the consideration of adaptive transmit
power in this paper makes the derivation of optimal SNR
threshold much more complicated.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we first present and compare the numerical
results for different transmission protocols. Then, we show the
interaction of different design parameters and their effects on
the reliability and security performance. Finally, we present
numerical results of the secrecy throughput to illustratively
show the performance improvement by the optimal design
parameters. The results shown in this section are all for the
network with α = 4, I0
/
σ2 = 10 dB, RB = 3, RS = 1,
dSD = 5 and dSP = 5.
We first compare the SOP and the COP of different trans-
mission protocols. Figure 3 plots the SOP, pso, and the COP,
pco, versus the eavesdropper density, λE . We note that as λE
increases, pso keeps increasing and pco remains constant. Com-
pared with the full activity protocol, the secrecy guard zone
protocol significantly decreases SOP while never alters COP.
The threshold-based protocol decreases COP while increases
SOP. This finding is different from the results for non-cognitive
networks [65] and [66], in which introducing the SNR thresh-
old does not increase the pso. As explained previously in
Section V, such a finding is due to the adaptive transmit power
adopted at the SU-Tx. In addition, these observations can help
the designers of real CR networks to appropriately select the
transmission protocol according to the importance of different
requirements. For example if the real network has a stringent
requirement on the reliability performance, it is preferable to
adopt the threshold-based protocol by ensuring the one-bit
feedback from the SU-Rx to SU-Tx. Taking the advantages
of the secrecy guard zone protocol and the threshold-based
protocol, the hybrid protocol can decrease both SOP and COP
compared with the full activity protocol.
We then compare the TSOP of different transmission pro-
tocols. Figure 4 plots the TSOP, ptso, versus the eavesdropper
density, λE . From the figure, we find that ptso is an increasing
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Fig. 4. TSOP versus the eavesdropper density for different transmission
protocols.
function of λE . As the reference, the full activity protocol has
the worst TSOP. The hybrid protocol performs the best. In
addition, when the eavesdropper density is low, the threshold-
based protocol outperforms the secrecy guard zone protocol.
On the contrary, the secrecy guard zone protocol outperforms
the threshold-based protocol, when the eavesdropper density
is high.
In the following, we present the impact of the SNR thresh-
old, µ, and the secrecy guard zone radius, r, on the network
performance by Figures 5, 6 and 7. Figure 5 plots ptx, pco, pso
and ptso, versus the SNR-threshold, µ. As the figure shows,
pco is a decreasing function of µ, and it is equal to zero when
µ ≥ 2RB − 1. The pso is an increasing function of µ and ptx
is a decreasing function of µ. These observations imply that a
larger SNR-threshold can enhance the reliability performance
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with eavesdropper density λE = 10−3.
while harm the security performance and the transmission
delay performance. Consequently, ptso, which characterizes
the joint performance of reliability and security, is not a
monotonous function of µ. The ptso firstly decreases and then
increases as µ increases, and ptso is minimized at µ = 2RB−1.
According to these observations, the designers of real CR
networks can wisely set up the SNR threshold to balance the
tradeoff among the delay, reliability and secrecy performances
of the network. Figure 6 plots the ptx, pco, pso and ptso versus
the radius of the secrecy guard zone, r. As shown in the figure,
both of pso and ptx are decreasing functions of r. This implies
that a high security level is achieved at the cost of a large
transmission delay. Thus, a large radius of the secrecy guard
zone is not always beneficial for real CR networks. In addition,
we find that COP remains constraint with the increase of the
Fig. 7. The secrecy throughput versus secrecy guard radius r and the
SNR-threshold µ with eavesdropper density λE = 10−3. The security and
reliability constraints are set as ε = 0.4, δ = 0.4
radius, since the COP is not related to the radius. Figure 7
plots the secrecy throughput, η, against µ and r. In the contour
plot, the values of the secrecy throughput from low to high
are represented by different colors from blue to red. The
security constraint is set as δ = 0.4 < δ1 and the reliability
constraint is set as ε = 0.4 < max (ε1, ε2) from Figure 2. As
shown in the figure, the non-zero secrecy throughput can be
achieved with proper designs of µ and r for the given network.
While, improper designs of µ and r will result in the zero
secrecy throughput of the transmission. These observations
directly present the importance of SNR threshold and secrecy
guard zone radius on the achievable secrecy throughput of
real CR networks. In addition, we find that there exists an
optimal pair of (r, µ) maximizing the secrecy throughput.
From Proposition 1, we obtain that the optimal pair of (r, µ)
for the given network is (r∗, µ∗) = (8.85, 4.35), which is
consistent with the results shown in the figure.
Finally, we compare the achievable secrecy throughput for
different transmission protocols versus the security constraint,
ε, and the reliability constraint, δ, by Figure 8. As shown in the
figure, the secrecy guard zone protocol can achieve the non-
zero secrecy throughput under more stringent security con-
straint, compared with the full activity protocol. The threshold-
based protocol can achieve the non-zero secrecy throughput
under more stringent reliability constraint, compared with the
full activity protocol. We also note that for the threshold-based
protocol, the security level has to be compromised to achieve
the non-zero secrecy throughput as the reliability constraint
becomes stricter. In addition, compared with the other three
protocols, the hybrid protocol can achieve the non-zero secrecy
throughput under the most stringent security and reliability
constraints. Therefore, we can summarize the wise choices of
different transmission protocols under different conditions as
follows. When both the security and the reliability constraints
are very loose, it is wise to adopt the full activity protocol
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Fig. 8. The optimized secrecy throughput η for different transmission
protocols as a function of the security constraint ε and the reliability constraint
δ with eavesdropper density λE = 10−3.
due to its simple mechanism. When the security constraint is
stringent but the reliability constraint is loose, it is preferable
to adopt the secrecy guard zone protocol. When the reliability
constraint is stringent but the security constraint is loose, it is
preferable to adopt the threshold-based protocol. When both
the security and the reliability constraints are stringent, it is
wise to adopt the hybrid protocol.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the secure communication in an
underlay CR networks with multiple movable eavesdroppers
with a HPPP location entity at each snapshot of time. Impor-
tantly, the location set of eavesdroppers is assumed unknown
at the legitimate side. We considered the scenario where
the SU-Tx sends confidential messages to the SU-Rx with
an instantaneous power constraint in order not to interfere
the PU. To achieve physical layer security in such a CR
network, we proposed four transmission protocols according
to different assumptions on the channel knowledge at SU-
Tx and the location knowledge about the eavesdroppers. We
comprehensively analyzed and compared the security, reliabil-
ity, transmission delay and overall performance for different
transmission protocols. Moreover, we optimized the design
parameters (r and/or µ) to maximize the secrecy throughput
for the proposed transmission protocols. Our results showed
that the secrecy guard zone protocol can improve security per-
formance while the threshold-based protocol can improve the
reliability performance, and the hybrid protocol can achieve
the best overall performance.
In this paper, we assumed that the encoding rates at the
transmitter are fixed, and hence are not design parameters.
One interesting future research direction is to investigate the
scenario where the encoding rates can be designed. This will
give more degrees of freedom for the transmission design. We
can further analyze the benefits brought by the design of en-
coding rates by comparing the achievable secrecy throughput
in such a scenario and the achievable secrecy throughput in this
work. Another interesting research direction is to investigate
the practical scenario where the CSI is imperfectly known at
the receiver side. This paper assumed that the perfect CSI is
available at the receiver, while the channel estimation at the
receiver is often not error-free in practice. Thus, it is interesting
to study the impact of having imperfect CSI at the receiver on
the design of secure CR networks.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We first determine the dependence of η on r and µ.
Substituting (39) and (41) into (11), the secrecy throughput
η can be derived as
η=
I0d
α
SP exp
(−piλEr2)
max {2RB − 1, µ}σ2dαSD + I0dαSP
× LZΦ˜E
(
max
{
2RB−1, µ}σ2dαSD+I0dαSP
(2RB−RS−1)σ2
)
RS .
(53)
Taking first-order derivative of η with respect to r, we obtain
∂η (r, µ)
∂r
=−2piλEr
(
1−(rαω−1 + 1)−1) η < 0, (54)
where ω =
max{µ,2RB−1}σ2dαSD+I0dαSP
σ2(2RB−RS−1) . This implies that the
secrecy throughput is a decreasing function of radius, r. In
addition, from (53) we find that when µ > 2RB − 1, η is a
decreasing function of µ and when µ ≤ 2RB − 1, η remains
constant. Therefore, it is wise to have µ ≤ 2RB − 1.
In the following, we derive the optimal values of r and µ
for different ranges of security and reliability constraints.
Case 1: δ ≥ δ1 and ε ≥ ε1, shown as the field A in Figure 2.
In this case, since security constraint is loose enough and η
is a decreasing function of r, it is optimal to set r = 0. The
lower bound of µ is equal to zero due to the loose reliability
constraint. In addition, to satisfy the security constraint, there
is an upper bound of µ. By solving pso = ε and according to
µ ≤ 2RB − 1, we derive the upper bound as (52). Thus, the
optimal values of r and µ for this case is given by
(r∗, µ∗) = (0, [0, µUB ]) . (55)
Case 2: δ ≥ δ1 and 0 < ε < ε1, shown as the field B in
Figure 2. In this case, the reliability constraint is loose enough
while the security constraint is stringent. To satisfy the security
constraint, there is a lower bound of r. By solving pso = ε,
we derive the lower bound as (50). From (50), we know that
g(µ) is an increasing function of µ. Since δ ≥ δ1, it is optimal
to minimize µ to zero. Therefore, the optimal values of r and
µ for this case is given by
(r∗, µ∗) = (g (0) , 0) . (56)
Case 3: 0 ≤ δ < δ1 and ε ≥ ε2, shown as the field
C in Figure 2. In this case, the security constraint is loose
enough while the reliability constraint is stringent. To satisfy
the reliability constraint, there is a lower bound of µ. By
solving pco = δ, we derive the lower bound as (51). Same
to Case 1, there is also an upper bound of µ given by (52) to
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satisfy the security constraint. Therefore, the optimal values
of r and µ for this case is given by
(r∗, µ∗) = (0, [µLB, µUB]) . (57)
Case 4: 0 < ε < ε2 and 0 ≤ δ < δ1, shown as the field D
in Figure 2. In this case, both the reliability and the security
constraints are stringent. To satisfy the reliability constraint,
there is a lower bound of µ given by (51). Same to the Case
2, there is a lower bound of r given by (50). Since g(µ) is an
increasing function of µ, it is optimal to minimize µ to µLB.
Hence, the optimal values of r and µ for this case is given by
(r∗, µ∗) = (g (µLB) , µLB) . (58)
Finally, the the optimal values of r and µ for different
constraint ranges are summarized by Proposition 1.
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